



Background Guide

DISEC

NVMUN 2025

Director's Letter

Dear Delegates,

My name is Thomas Chen, and I am pleased to extend my warmest welcome to everyone participating in the Disarmament and International Security Committee (DISEC) at NVMUN 2025. As a Grade 10 student at St. George's School, I am excited to be serving as your Director, alongside your Chair, Julia Tran, and your Vice-Chair, Nathan Lee. Our staff team has planned an engaging experience for you all, and we hope that each of you acquires something valuable from this conference. Model UN has both renewed my passion for politics and extended my knowledge in foreign affairs and current events.

The Disarmament and International Security Committee strives to maintain international peace and security through constructive cooperation. At this iteration of NVMUN, we will discuss *Regulating Autonomous Weapon Systems and AI in Warfare*. Through this topic, I hope you are inspired to engage in meaningful debate and expand your horizons in the world of diplomacy.

Please keep in mind that although not mandatory, you are highly encouraged to write a position paper. Submitting and crafting your position would not only enhance your understanding of the topic, but will also make you eligible for awards.

I wish you the best of luck in your preparations and research, and should you have any questions, please feel free to contact me at disec@nvmun.org. I look forward to meeting all of you at NVMUN 2025.

Sincerely,

Thomas Chen
DISEC Director, NVMUN 2025

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Committee Overview

The Disarmament and International Security Committee (DISEC) was established in 1945 alongside the United Nations (UN).¹ It includes all UN Member States and is tasked with addressing matters related to disarmament, global challenges to international security, and threats to peace that fall within the scope of the General Assembly.² Topics discussed frequently in this committee include nuclear disarmament, conventional weapons regulation, and international conflict prevention.

Every year, all 193 member states of the committee are welcome to attend the five weeks after the UN General Assembly General Debate. The Disarmament and International Security Committee, like all general assemblies, conducts sessions in three distinct stages: general debate, thematic discussion, and action on drafts.³ In order to follow these norms, we strongly encourage all delegates to be engaged and come prepared to maintain an effective flow of debate.

However, although DISEC does not have the authority to impose legally binding measures, it does have the capacity to set international norms, draft recommendations, and facilitate structured dialogue on international security. Therefore, policies passed by the committee are not legally binding and will not have an immediate impact or effect until implemented by the member states themselves. To effectively implement measures that are agreed upon, DISEC works closely with the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to garner the appropriate attention they deserve.⁴

Topic Overview

Autonomous weapons systems (AWS) are military platforms that, once activated, can select and engage targets without direct human intervention. These systems range from unmanned aerial drones to advanced missile defense systems.⁵ Proponents argue that AWS and other AI-powered technologies may improve military accuracy, minimize collateral damage, and reduce risks to military personnel. However, the use of AWS presents many ethical and legal challenges. Accountability and compliance with International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and whether machines should be allowed to make life-and-death decisions pose as major points of contention.⁶

Given the rapidly evolving technological landscape, there are no binding international frameworks specifically regulating AWS. Recent debates surrounding the topic follow the same structure as the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW). Some states have

¹ <https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter>

² <https://www.un.org/en/ga/first/>

³ <https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter/full-text>

⁴ <https://main.un.org/securitycouncil/en/content/what-security-council>

⁵ <https://lieber.westpoint.edu/artificial-intelligence-armed-conflict-current-state-international-law/>

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<https://www.hrw.org/report/2025/04/28/hazard-human-rights/autonomous-weapons-systems-and-digital-decision-making>

advocated for complete bans on lethal autonomous weapons, while others argue that transparency measures or national-level guidelines can be used to navigate this new era.⁷ This lack of consensus reflects the increasingly large divide in the international community: states with advanced technological and military capabilities often resist restrictions, while others support concrete regulations to mitigate an arms race or potential misuse of AWS.

The appeal towards AI-based warfare is due to a perceived cost-effectiveness and efficiency of these systems. However, reliance comes at the risk of reducing human oversight in military operations. For example, in scenarios where autonomous systems unlawfully target civilians, responsibility will be difficult to assign, whether it's programmers, commanders, or the machine itself.⁸

As AWS continues to become more prevalent every day, DISEC has a responsibility to establish clear international norms and accountability mechanisms. Through these efforts, member states would not only achieve balanced military innovation but would also ensure that technological advancements do not destroy existing protection and international law.

Timeline of Events

1949 - The Geneva Conventions are adopted, forming the cornerstone of International Humanitarian Law (IHL), which later becomes central in debates over AWS and compliance with the laws of war.

1980 - The Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) enters into force, establishing a framework for member states to discuss emerging and potentially inhumane military technologies.

2001 - The United States conducts the first major combat operations with armed drones in Afghanistan, sparking international concern about automation and accountability in warfare.

2012 - Human Rights Watch and other NGOs launch The Campaign to Stop Killer Robots, calling for a preemptive ban on lethal autonomous weapon systems (LAWS).

2013 - The UN Human Rights Council publishes the Heyns Report, urging states to adopt a moratorium on AWS development until ethical and legal questions are addressed.

2014 - The CCW holds its first informal Meeting of Experts on LAWS, marking the beginning of structured UN-level discussions on the issue.

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<https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2024/08/understanding-the-global-debate-on-lethal-autonomous-weapons-systems-an-indian-perspective>

⁸ <https://www.esd.whs.mil/portals/54/documents/dd/issuances/dodd/300009p.pdf>

2017 - The CCW establishes a Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on LAWS, tasked with examining definitions, risks, and regulatory options for autonomous weapons.

2018 - The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) formally recommends that member states ensure “meaningful human control” over all uses of autonomous weapons systems.

2021 - The GGE on LAWS fails to reach consensus on a legally binding treaty, reflecting sharp divisions between member states advocating bans and those prioritizing military innovation.

2023 - At the UN General Assembly First Committee (DISEC), a coalition of 70+ states calls for legally binding restrictions on AWS, while major military powers such as China and the United States continue to resist such measures.

Historical Background

Introduction and Origins

The roots of the weaponization of artificial intelligence (AI) can be traced back long before the birth of AI itself. In the early twentieth century, mechanized vehicles such as tanks, airplanes and submarines significantly altered the military landscape. With this revolution also came the first iterations of automated targeting systems such as proximity fuzes.⁹ This marked the first steps towards reducing human involvement in tactical tasks. Following World War II, radar-guided weapons and early computer-assisted targeting became the norm for modern warfare. This caused a spike in automated, decision-making weapons, reflecting a silent arms race for enhanced speed, precision, and efficiency in military operations. The Cold War intensified the demand for advanced weaponry, especially for the United States and the Soviet Union. Both of these global superpowers invested heavily in cybernetics, computing, space control, and autonomous guidance systems.¹⁰ A popular example of weapons developed during this time is the cruise missile. This explosive warhead could track and select humans without constant human control. These developments showed how technological competition shaped the direction of military innovation and how nations continue to seek strategic advantage through greater autonomy in weapons.

The Birth of Artificial Intelligence in Warfare

Post-Cold War AI research accelerated exponentially both for civilian and military applications. Enhanced computer power and machine learning technology prompted militaries to investigate the possibilities of AI in surveillance, logistics, and command-and-control. The introduction of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) in the 1990s and 2000s was a major turning point which gave birth to systems such as the MQ-1 Predator drone.¹¹ While initially dependent on human operators, this drone represented the potential of remote and fully automated warfare.

⁹ <https://www.britannica.com/technology/proximity-fuze>

¹⁰

<https://www.usmcu.edu/Outreach/Marine-Corps-University-Press/MCU-Journal/JAMS-vol-14-no-2/Cold-War-Computer-Arms-Race/>

¹¹ <https://www.af.mil/About-Us/Fact-Sheets/Display/Article/104469/mq-1b-predator/>

Exponential acceleration of computer power and advances in machine learning set militaries to investigate the possibilities of AI in surveillance, logistics, and command-and-control. The introduction of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) in the 1990s and 2000s was a turning point. Systems such as the MQ-1 Predator drone, while initially dependent on human operators, represented the idea of remote war and eventual automation potential.

Early 2000s and Recent Global Tensions

As the early 2000s approached, the issue of autonomy in weapons systems came into focus, with scientists and politicians arguing about the implications of entrusting machines with lethal decision-making capabilities. Despite these concerns, military planning became increasingly integrated with AI during the 2010s as global power rivalry shook the world once again. The United States, Russia, and China invested billions of dollars on AI technologies such as intelligence analysis, predictive logistics, identification, and “kill chain” target finding. This innovation replicated the pattern in military history of new technology being adopted by forces to deliver speed and efficiency; however, placing their most essential decisions in computers heightened risks. In the perspectives of global powers, AI ensured informational superiority and improved decision-making, but to most Global South states, it threatened to widen the technological gap between affluent and struggling nations.¹² Shortly following the integration of automatic weapons, issues surrounding accountability and proportionality appeared. The concept of “meaningful human control” appeared as nations feared that life-or-death decisions would be made autonomously. The United Nations and other international organizations gradually acknowledged the gravity of these trends, and reports made it clear how the militarization of AI had deep implications for global security and stability. By the 2020s, experts stressed the dangers of AI weaponization.¹³ Analysts made historical parallels with chemical and nuclear weapons, highlighting that technologies initially celebrated as scientific breakthroughs were soon converted into weapons of mass destruction. Existing research has also cautioned that AI would further enhance the weapon manufacturing process, lowering proliferation hurdles. These concerns echoed a familiar theme: with every technological advance in war—whether its mechanization to atomic power to computer science—societies have struggled to balance between military autonomy and human control.¹⁴

Significance and Conclusion

The historical record of AI weaponization is one of both continuity and change. It is an extension

¹² <https://www.weforum.org/stories/2023/01/davos23-ai-divide-global-north-global-south/>

¹³

https://unidir.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/UNIDIR_AI_military_domain_implications_international_peace_security.pdf

¹⁴

<https://europeanleadershipnetwork.org/commentary/the-fast-and-the-deadly-when-artificial-intelligence-meets-weapons-of-mass-destruction/>

of a centuries-long trend of militaries seeking faster, better, and smarter technologies. From early automation in World War II to modern advanced AI applications, the history of military AI has been shaped by technological dominance, strategic ambition, and recurrent ethical argumentation. This history demonstrates that debates over AI in warfare cannot be explained in a simple manner—they are the most recent events in a century-long narrative of innovation and competition.

Past UN/Committee Involvement

UN Discussions and Initiatives

The beginning of UN involvement with AI in militarized contexts started with acknowledging the risks of fully autonomous weapons systems. In 2023, the UN Institute for Disarmament Research published *Artificial Intelligence Beyond Weapons*, a report that examined the applicational breadth of AI in military operations, both lethal and non-lethal.¹⁵ The report addressed the challenges of governance on accountability, legal, and ethical compliance. It emphasized the necessity of inclusive and multi-faceted dialogue focusing on states, civil society, and techno-legal professionals on the governance of military AI. They provided guidance on governance and the use of emerging technologies. The guidance was provided without the risk of unnecessarily stifling emerging technologies and their use for military purposes and innovations.

The UN approach has also been significantly influenced by the General Assembly. In December 2024, the Assembly adopted Resolution 79/62, which calls on the Secretary-General to “seek the views of Member States and observers on the issue of autonomous weapons systems.” The Resolution called for the incorporation of legal, humanitarian, technological, and ethical considerations and analyses concerning the use and deployment of such systems.¹⁶ In the following General Assembly session, and particularly the First Committee, a broader array of topics was introduced which allowed for extended debate on the issue.

The United Nations Security Council and Expert Consultations

Beyond the General Assembly, the UN Security Council has paid close attention to how AI affects international security and peace. The UNSC acknowledges the many benefits of integrating AI into the military as it has the capacity to enhance peacekeeping missions and deliver improved logistics.¹⁷ However, the committee has also argued that AI-powered weapons could bring unnecessary escalation of conflict, or even kill innocent civilians. These exchanges have indicated that international standards and regulations must be built to prevent irresponsible

¹⁵ <https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC11575148/>

¹⁶ <https://docs.un.org/en/A/RES/79/62>

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<https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/whatsinblue/2025/09/high-level-open-debate-on-artificial-intelligence.php>

use of artificial intelligence in military contexts. Not only would this ensure transparency between member states, but it would also enhance accountability measures during the research and development of such weapons.

Apart from official meetings, the UN had organized informal debates and expert panels regarding the weaponization of AI.¹⁸ These meetings gathered technical specialists, policymakers, and delegates from various Member States to explore the dangers and opportunities of autonomous weapons and the necessary regulations that should have been implemented. These informal discussions had been opportunities for the UN to thoroughly examine the feasibility of certain measures, technical protection, and how AI would have played a role in military planning. The expert panels during these events provided recommendations on probable frameworks of monitoring AI usage and promoting ethical AI integration. With all these discussions, the UN sought to ensure that technical expertise informed policy choices so that innovation and responsibility were approached in a balanced manner.¹⁹

The Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW)

The Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW), which entered into force in 1983 and was later amended in 2001, was a key instrument of international humanitarian law (IHL).²⁰ Designed with flexibility in mind, the convention aimed to adapt to new technologies used in armed conflict. At the time, it contained five protocols that outlined “specific prohibitions, restrictions and other provisions on certain types of weapons.” However, autonomous weapons and AI-driven systems were not included in these protocols, likely because of how new the technology was and the uncertainty around how it could be regulated.

In 2014, a meeting of experts was convened to “discuss the questions related to emerging technologies in the area of lethal autonomous weapons systems, in the context of the objectives and purposes of the Convention.” This marked an important step in beginning an official dialogue on autonomous weaponry and highlighted areas that required further study.²¹ From that point on, the CCW High Contracting Parties examined the implications and challenges posed by lethal autonomous weapons (LAWs) through a group of governmental experts, keeping the conversation active and continuing to explore the impact of these technologies and their threat to IHL.

Although no formal amendments had yet been made to the CCW, these discussions represented progress toward addressing the international security risks linked to autonomous weapons. These risks had grown significantly as AI advanced and improved the capabilities of such systems. Still, to truly limit or prevent the development and use of AWS and AI-based weaponry, the

¹⁸ <https://press.un.org/en/2025/sqsm22830.doc.htm>

¹⁹ https://www.un.org/sites/un2.un.org/files/governing_ai_for_humanity_final_report_en.pdf

²⁰ https://www.icrc.org/sites/default/files/external/doc/en/assets/files/other/icrc_002_0811.pdf

²¹ <https://docs.un.org/en/CCW/MSP/2014/3>

CCW would need to explicitly include restrictions or prohibitions.²² Given the ethical concerns surrounding the weaponization of AI, adding AWS to the CCW would ensure that any potential use aligned with the principles of IHL.

Current Situation

Ethical Concerns: The Moral Dimensions of AI in Warfare

Integrating AI into military operations introduces profound ethical challenges. The UN shows concerns surrounding life-and-death decisions made by machines. Accountability and the preservation of human dignity remain as topics of contention for the UN and other non-governmental organizations. The potential for AI to misidentify targets or fail to account for contextual nuances could result in unintended civilian casualties, undermining the ethical foundations of warfare. Furthermore, the term “black boxes” is used as a term to describe the opacity of AI decision-making processes.²³ This lack of transparency challenges existing decade-old frameworks and calls for the development of new norms and regulation to adapt to the new era of artificial intelligence. As highlighted by experts and analysis, the objectification of human targets facilitated by AI may lead to a diminished sense of moral agency among operators. Addressing these ethical dilemmas requires concerted effort and constant dialogue between nations to ensure strict adherence to international standards regarding AI technologies.²⁴

Technological Inequalities: The Global Divide in AI Capabilities

The rapid advancement of AI technologies and weapons has widened many existing technology inequalities between affluent nations and poorer nations such as those in the Global South. Countries with advanced technological infrastructure and resources are at the forefront of deploying and developing AI-driven weapon systems, thereby gaining strategic advantages in warfare. In contrast, nations with limited access to such technologies may find themselves at a significant disadvantage, unable to compete in the evolving landscape of modern combat.²⁵ This disparity not only affects military capabilities but also has broader implications for global security and stability. The proliferation of AI-powered weapons could lead to an arms race, with nations striving to outpace each other in the development of increasingly sophisticated systems. Such competition may divert resources from critical areas like education and healthcare, further entrenching global inequalities. Additionally, the lack of international consensus on regulations governing AI in warfare raises concerns about the potential misuse of these technologies by state

²² <https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0094576525006009?via%3Dihub>

²³ <https://www.ibm.com/think/topics/black-box-ai>

²⁴ <https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2666789425000868>

²⁵

<https://kissinger.sais.jhu.edu/programs-and-projects/kissinger-center-papers/technology-complexity-uncertainty-and-deterrence/>

and non-state actors alike.²⁶ To mitigate these risks, it is imperative for the international community to engage in dialogue aimed at establishing equitable frameworks that promote the responsible development and deployment of AI technologies, ensuring that their benefits are shared globally and not concentrated in the hands of a few.

Rapid Advancement of AI Integration: The Pace of Military Innovation

The integration of AI into military operations is occurring at an unprecedented pace, outstripping the development of regulatory frameworks and ethical guidelines. This rapid advancement presents significant challenges in ensuring that AI technologies are employed responsibly and effectively. In conflict zones such as Ukraine, the deployment of AI-enabled drones has demonstrated both the potential and the limitations of these systems.²⁷ While AI can enhance the speed and precision of military operations, it also introduces new risks, including the possibility of autonomous systems making decisions that may not align with strategic objectives or ethical considerations. The complexity of AI algorithms and the potential for unforeseen interactions with other systems underscore the need for robust oversight and continuous evaluation. Furthermore, the reliance on AI in military contexts raises concerns about the erosion of human judgment and accountability. As AI systems become more integrated into decision-making processes, there is a risk that human operators may defer to machine-generated recommendations without fully understanding the underlying logic or potential consequences. This shift could lead to a diminished sense of responsibility and an increased likelihood of unintended escalations. To address these challenges, it is essential to develop comprehensive policies that govern the use of AI in military operations, ensuring that human oversight remains central and that ethical considerations are prioritized in the deployment of these technologies.

Potential Solutions

Enhancing Understanding of International Humanitarian Laws

Inconsistent interpretation of international humanitarian laws poses obstacles to achieving a consensus on regulating autonomous weapons. The interpretive flexibility of such laws allows states to manipulate legal principles in accordance to their context, compromising the effectiveness and consistency of the laws. To solidify legal norms, member states must clarify the situational application of international humanitarian laws relating to AWS and establish tangible consequences for violators.

²⁶

<https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2024/03/envisioning-a-global-regime-complex-to-govern-artificial-intelligence?lang=en>

²⁷

<https://www.csis.org/analysis/ukraines-future-vision-and-current-capabilities-waging-ai-enabled-autonomous-warfare>

Existing international laws such as the UN Charter, International Humanitarian Law (IHL), International Human Rights Law (IHRL), International Criminal Law (ICL), and the Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (ARSIWA), can be applicable to LAWS if explicitly interpreted as such.²⁸ However, the lack of specific provisions regarding AWS within these laws may mitigate their applicability on the issue. Dialogue is emphasized on distinguishing aspects of IHL relating to LAWS, including accountability of weapon usage, proportionality, and the Martens Clause.²⁹

Furthering Negotiation on Emerging Law Enforcements

Several states have noted that AWS elicits challenges for compliance with international humanitarian law, international human rights law, and international criminal law, as there is currently no specific regulation governing autonomous weapons. Though aspects of existing international laws may serve to address ethical issues arising from unmanned warfare operations, there are lacunae within the protocols as they were not designed to regulate LAWS. A pivotal solution to confront the improper utilization of autonomous weapons lies in the negotiation of a legally binding law enforcement that can adapt to the perpetual advancement of AI.

According to the Report of the Secretary-General at the 79th UN General Assembly First Committee conference, states endorsing a legally binding instrument recommend incorporating relevant principles of established international laws into its content to ensure compliance with prevailing legal frameworks. Additionally, the legal instrument should reflect a comprehensive and holistic approach to the issue while respecting the national sovereignty and development of all nations. On the whole, initiatives are advised to promote equitable participation between member states and must be consistent for all parties to follow, regardless of each party's economic standing.

In tandem with forming a LAWS-focused law enforcement, emphasis should be placed on furthering interstate dialogue in order to explore and understand the position of each state on the application of LAWS in warfare. Demonstrating a diversity of perspective is essential to ensure inclusivity in the law development process. The ultimate goal is to establish a unified stance on the matter and foster a legal instrument for LAWS through constructive negotiations.

Preserving Human Control and Strengthening Accountability Measures

Debate over LAWS is not merely a matter of national security or ethical warfare, it also touches upon the fundamental morals of humanity. The Sustainable Peace and Development Organization asserts that the use of LAWS diminish the fundamental foundation of society, which calls for the preservation of life, by placing the value of human life in the hands of killer

²⁸ <https://docs.un.org/en/A/79/88>

²⁹ <https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/29/issue/1>

robots. Facilitation of AWS leads to actions that contravene moral values embedded within teachings of all faiths, reducing humans to mere data points and stripping them of intrinsic values. Therefore, preserving human control over AWS should be the key objective of international dialogue.

Clear accountability measures must be established for incidents in which LAWS commits a violation to international laws, delineating responsibility among the state, the operator, and the manufacturer. There is a critical issue undermining fair liability; major powers, including the USA and the Russian Federation, selectively adhere to international legal standards based on strategic interest, inflicting on the credibility of legal frameworks such as the International Humanitarian Law (IHL). Strict consequences must be instituted to ensure violations of existing and emerging international laws are adjudicated efficiently.

Bloc Positions

Prohibition Bloc

Consisting of Argentina, Brazil, Nigeria, Italy, and many other countries, this bloc pushes for the implementation of a legally binding treaty regulating the usage of LAWS. These countries participated in the 79th UN General Assembly First Committee conference which occurred in October 2024, which produced Draft Resolution L.77 addressing the implications of AWS. Most were in favour of the resolution with the exception of China which abstained. China expressed concerns regarding fully autonomous weapons and called for the prohibition of such weapons in 2018, but later specified that its call was restricted to the usage of AWS, excluding their production³⁰.

Middle-Ground Bloc

Countries within this bloc, including Canada, France, Iran, Latvia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Syria, Türkiye, Ukraine, and Vietnam, have not declared their stance on a legally binding treaty. Vietnam, Syria, Singapore, and Iran are member states of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), an international organization supporting the negotiation of a treaty for LAWS, so these countries may therefore be regarded as supporting the initiative. However, it is emphasized that these member states have not independently declared their position on the matter. Canada and France voted in favour of Resolution L.77 at the 79th UN General Assembly First Committee conference but have not shown overt support for a new treaty. Türkiye, Ukraine, Latvia, and

³⁰ <https://automatedresearch.org/state-positions/>

Saudi Arabia abstained from voting on Resolution L.77, confirming their neutrality with respect to this issue³¹.

Tech-Power Bloc

This bloc consists of the United States of America (USA), the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom (UK), the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), the Republic of Korea, Australia, India, Israel, Japan, and Estonia. The USA and the Russian Federation are among major powers looking to augment their national weapon systems through LAWS, and therefore have strongly objected to proposals for a new treaty on the matter while branding such measures “premature.”³² The United Kingdom, Estonia, and Israel are of the belief that protocols within existing IHL are sufficient in regulating autonomous weapons.³³ Australia, DPRK, India, and the Republic of Korea are actively investing in the development and application of AWS within their respective military systems, and therefore do not support treaties that could impede this progress. Although his bloc advocates against a treaty for LAWS, countries within the bloc may be open to explore non-restricting initiatives.

Discussion Questions

1. How can “meaningful human control” in the use of force be clearly defined and enforced in the context of AI-driven military systems?
2. Who should bear responsibility when an autonomous system violates international humanitarian law—the state, the military commander, the programmer, or the manufacturer?
3. In what ways can the international community prevent an arms race in AI-enabled weapons while ensuring that technological innovation is not stifled?
4. What mechanisms should the international community pursue to regulate or restrict autonomous weapon systems: a binding international treaty, national legislation, or voluntary codes of conduct?

³¹

<https://automatedresearch.org/news/autonomous-weapons-at-the-79th-united-nations-general-assembly-first-committee/>

³²

<https://www.hrw.org/report/2020/08/10/stopping-killer-robots/country-positions-banning-fully-autonomous-weapons-and>

³³

<https://www.hrw.org/report/2020/08/10/stopping-killer-robots/country-positions-banning-fully-autonomous-weapons-and>

Further Resources

1. [War, AI and the New Global Arms Race | Alexandr Wang | TED](#)
2. [Designing International Law and Ethics into Military Artificial Intelligence \(DILEMA\) - YouTube](#)
3. [ICRC Position Paper: Artificial intelligence and machine learning in armed conflict: A human-centred approach](#)
4. [Artificial Intelligence and the Future of Warfare](#)

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